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Abstract: 
The UK’s automotive industry has been one of the ‘star performers’ of the UK 
economy in recent years – unlike most other manufacturing sectors. Output has 
increased by 60% since 2010 and there has been over £8bn worth of investment in 
the industry in the last four years. The industry supports some 800,000 jobs in the 
UK. The industry is seen as having benefitted from EU membership. So what doest 
Brexit mean for the UK automotive sector, and in turn for industrial policy in the UK? 
This paper considers short run impacts, before turning to the impact of uncertainty 
on foreign direct investment inflows and then the nature of a possible trading 
relationship. Some concluding thoughts highlight the need for a renewed industrial 
policy to support UK auto and manufacturing.  
 
Introduction 
The upturn in the UK automotive industry in recent years has seen output increasing 
by over 0% since 2010, with over £8bn worth of investment in the industry in the last 
five years (SMMT, 2016). The industry supports some 800,000 jobs in total in the 
UK. This upturn has benefitted regions, such as the West Midlands which have 
struggled with deindustrialisation, plant closures and the legacy of the global 
financial crisis (Bailey and Berkeley, 2014; Bailey et al 2015; Bailey and de Ruyter, 
2015). There are many reasons for this recent automotive industry success – the 
skills base, cooperative working between unions and management, links with 
universities, a supportive industrial policy and so on. But it should also be noted that 
                                                 
1
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a key factor for the success has also been access to the EU Single Market.  Indeed, 
the industry is seen as having benefitted from EU membership, and not only in 
accessing the single market, but also through the EU cutting trade deals with the rest 
of the world, in the UK influencing EU regulations, and in accessing skilled workers 
and European research funding and networks (KPMG, 2014). So what might 
Britain’s departure for the EU mean for the UK automotive sector (hereafter ‘UK 
auto’), and in turn for industrial policy in the UK? 
This paper considers short run impacts, before turning to the effect of uncertainty on 
foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows, firm specific impacts, the nature of a possible 
trading relationship, and the need for a renewed industrial policy to support UK auto 
and manufacturing.  
Short-run Market and Production Impacts  
A starting point in understanding the impact of the Brexit vote on the UK auto 
industry is to consider its impact on the wider UK economy, both in terms of 
economic growth and the value of sterling.  For example, a possible slowdown in 
economic growth is likely to impact on car sales in the UK, so at best car sales are 
likely to grow more slowly than otherwise and at worst may fall. For example, PA 
Consulting forecast a possible fall in UK car sales in the 5% - 10% range (PA 
Consulting, 2016) post Brexit referendum, while the consultancy firm LMC revised 
down its base forecast for the UK’s light vehicle market by 15% to 2.55m units for 
2018 (versus 3m units in 2015) - a reduction in forecast market volume of over 
400,000 units for 2018 (LMC, 2016).2 However, this negative outlook for the auto 
market was offset to some extent by the Bank of England’s loosening of monetary 
policy immediately after the referendum (including cuts in interest rates and more 
quantitative easing), which helped to reduce financing rates on new cars. The Bank 
is now signalling that rates may rise.  
With regards to the currency, the value of sterling fell significantly in the aftermath of 
the Brexit vote (notwithstanding the recovery in Sterling’s value in September 2017). 
For UK based auto assemblers, this depreciation should boost exports. In response 
to this, firms have a choice between increasing output and increasing prices to raise 
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Europe in anticipation of a slowdown of UK car sales. Ford also cut third quarter European output by 
over 80,000 units in the wake of the Brexit decision. 
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margins.3 Nevertheless, this should help boost UK auto output in the short term to 
over 1.8m units.4  So the immediate likely impact on UK auto would seem to be 
‘output up but domestic sales down’. 
At the same time, however, imported cars and components will become more 
expensive for the consumer and industry alike. On average, only around 40% of the 
components that comprise a UK assembled car are sourced locally, as against 60% 
in Germany (SMMT, 2016), given the nature of fragmented supply chains in UK 
automotive (Bailey and De Propris, 2014).  By late 2016 the exchange rate 
depreciation was already feeding through into inflation, especially in relation to 
imported components and factory input prices.5 Such forces will impact on different 
firms in different ways. Jaguar Land Rover, for example, source a higher proportion 
of components in the UK and also have higher margins to play with than, say, 
General Motors through its Vauxhall brand. Both firms have worked hard in recent 
years to raise their levels of UK sourcing. That could become an imperative if sterling 
settles down at a lower exchange rate and imported components become too costly. 
Those auto brands that do not assemble in the UK and only import cars have been 
negatively by the fall in sterling over the last year as their cars have become more 
expensive here (or their margins are squeezed). So in terms of the auto market in 
the UK, the ‘bottom line’ is that cars (whether imported or made in the UK) are likely 
to become more expensive; this can be seen in prices edging over since late 2016 
notwithstanding recent discount and ‘scrappage’ schemes as the Uk auto market has 
softened.6 Furthermore, as noted, a slowdown in economic growth is also likely, 
which will impact on car sales. 
 
Uncertainty and FDI 
There are a number of ways in which Brexit could impact on FDI flows to the UK – 
whether from the EU or beyond (Dhingra et al, 2016; Driffield and Karoglou, 2016; 
Bailey et al, 2017). Firstly, as in other manufacturing sectors, auto production is 
                                                 
3
 ONS data seems to suggest the latter more broadly (The Guardian, 15/09/2017). 
4
 As noted, a weak UK currency (sterling) might offer an export advantage, if it persists over time, but 
in low-margin manufacturing such as mass market auto, currency fluctuations may be seen as a 
negative strategic factor for investors (LMC, 2016b). 
5
 The Office for National Statistics stated in August 2016 that input prices rose 4.3% in July 2016, the 
first annual increase since September 2013 (Financial Times, 16/08/2016). 
6
 Dhingra et al (2016) suggest that UK car prices could rise by 2.5% after Brexit. 
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fragmented along global value chains (GVCs) of multi-tier suppliers that cross 
borders and continents. Such GVCs are coordinated from strategic locations where 
the original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) are located and fan out seeking to 
maximize strategic advantages. Coordinating such supply chains may become more 
costly with Brexit. Components going into modules that are put together by systems 
integrators for delivery to final auto assemblers may be subject to different 
regulations, for example, or be subject to import duties when the UK has left the EU.  
Secondly, FDI-flows into the UK have been used as a platform to access the EU 
Single Market, with multinationals benefitting from the elimination of tariff and non-
tariff barriers. This may change if the terms of trade with the EU are re-drawn. 
Indeed, ongoing uncertainty over the nature of future trading relations between the 
UK and the EU is likely to affect inward investment in the industry in the UK. Foreign 
investment has been key to the renewal of the industry, with some £8bn invested in 
the sector over the last five years (SMMT, 2016) and £1.66bn invested in 2016 
(Financial Times, 2017). That fell to some £322m in the first half of 2017 (ibid). 
As Bailey et al (2017) note, the biggest single deterrent to foreign investment is 
uncertainty. The more uncertainty that firms attach to their ‘net present value 
calculations’, the less likely they are to invest. They note that the single event that 
caused the greatest decline in inward investment in recent history was Britain leaving 
the Exchange Rate Mechanism, not because it necessarily implied any particular 
weakness about the UK economy, but because of the uncertainty that surrounded it. 
In contrast, they note that the single event that has had the greatest positive impact 
on inward investment in the UK in recent history was the creation of the single 
market. This was because it became easier for firms to conduct business within their 
organization across national borders. For example, automotive and engine 
assemblers like GM, BMW and Ford all import sizeable inflows of components to the 
UK from their other EU operations and from the broader value chain.  
The key point here is that trade is no longer bilateral between countries; rather trade 
is characterized by fine grained cross-border GVCs where the end product 
incorporates inputs from multiple origins. Indeed, industrial production today occurs 
through the veins of global production networks (Coe and Yeung, 2015) that span 
borders and are headed by multinationals (some of which are starting to originate 
from emerging economies such as China; Matthews, 2006). The GVC model 
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suggests that not all stages of production contribute with the same value added to 
the final product (Gereffi et al 2006). As KPMG (2014) illustrate, a typical driveline 
system produced by GKN, the British-based supplier of automotive driveline 
technologies and systems, incorporates specialist forged parts from Spain, Italy, 
France and Germany which are then assembled at GKN Driveline’s UK factory and 
supplied to automotive assemblers in the UK and EU. This is illustrated in Figure 1 
below.7  The components, assembled drivelines and the then final assembled car 
could cross the English Channel several times. 
 
Figure 1: GKN Drivelines: illustration of an integrated supply chain. 
As noted above, these value chains need to be ‘frictionless’ in terms of non-tariff 
barriers (think of regulations and standards) as well as tariffs. As KPMG (2016: 13) 
noted before the vote: 
“Original equipment manufacturers such as aircraft and automotive manufacturers 
could perhaps favour the simplicity and flexibility of an EU-supply base rather than 
dealing with the potential complexities of a company based outside the union. In the 
long term, more EU-based alternatives would emerge. As buyers churned their 
suppliers, UK firms might become more marginalised. The integration of supply 
chains is a double edged sword – our manufacturers are not indispensable”. 
                                                 
7
 Reproduced with permission of KPMG. 
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Anything which puts these value chain relationships at risk, whether currency risk or 
higher transactions costs from having to deal with EU and UK regulations separately, 
reduces the likelihood of further investment.  As Driffield and Karoglou (2016) note, if 
one looks at past events in terms of magnitude, Brexit may have a short term 
negative shock on inward investment. They suggest that it would then take about 4 
years for the UK to get back to a new lower long-term trend of inward investment.   
The trade issue is also critical as over 80% of cars assembled in the UK are 
exported, and over 50% of these exports go to Europe (SMMT, 2016). Maintaining 
access to the Single Market is therefore critical. The uncertainty on trade needs to be 
‘nailed down’ as soon and as clearly as possible so that investors can retain 
confidence that they can assemble in the UK, accessing components through 
European value chains, and then export the end product to Europe without tariff or 
non-tariff barriers.  A transitional deal is hence important not only to avoid a ‘cliff 
edge’ Brexit but also to underpin short term investment in the auto industry. 
 
What trading relationship? 
As noted, the UK has yet to say what trading relationship it wants with the EU. 
Brexiteers didn’t actually spell out what they wanted and may not actually agree, and 
it’s not clear how the EU will in turn respond.  At the time of writing (September 
2017) it is not clear how this will play out.  It should be noted that if the UK was to fall 
back on World Trade Organisation rules in the absence of a trade deal with the EU 
then tariffs on cars could be as high as 10%, and on components as high as 4%. The 
industry body the Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders (SMMT) has stated 
that if trade tariffs are imposed it is likely to mean £2.7bn of levies on cars being 
imported into Britain and £1.8bn on those being exported (SMMT, 2016b).  A tariff of 
10% on completed cars would represent a considerable burden for the mass industry 
and would represent far more than the total of wages and profits in the industry 
(Holmes, 2016). 
On trading arrangements post-Brexit, during the referendum campaign, some 
suggested that Norway and Switzerland are examples that could be followed, as 
they are outside of the EU and enjoy forms of free trade with the EU. Switzerland's 
position is somewhat complicated and based on a number of bilateral agreements. 
Citation: De Propris, L. & Bailey (2017) Brexit and the UK automotive industry, National Institute Economic Review  
 
7 
 
Some sectors of its economy are not covered (services, for example). It's a kind of a-
la-carte ‘Swiss Cheese’ approach. Like Switzerland, Norway pays into the EU budget 
and gets access to the single market (on a comprehensive basis in its case), but 
must follow EU rules and has no input into devising EU regulations. In both cases, 
they are free to negotiate trade deals independently of the EU. So, could the UK ‘do 
a Norway’ and stay in the single market at least as part of a transitional deal? That 
would minimize the economic damage of leaving the EU, but will be tricky given that 
the Leave campaign had immigration as a core issue. Complete freedom of 
movement for people in the single market is likely to be a sticking point for the UK, 
as might be paying into the EU budget as part of a transitional arrangement.  
Of course, some auto firms based in mainland Europe will want to continue to trade 
with the UK (the UK is BMW’s second largest market in Europe for example) and are 
already taking a hit on exports to the UK with the depreciation of sterling. There will 
be some desire to get a deal of sorts done.8 Yet completely free trade on all goods 
and services (as now) but without paying into the EU budget or agreeing to the free 
movement of people is probably going to be a non-starter. A deal will have to be 
done, but the compromise will take some time to sort out, and that uncertainty is 
itself a major risk in terms of inward foreign investment in the auto industry. So there 
is uncertainty, and industry is uncertain as to how long it will go on. An interim or 
transitional deal on trade and skills is seen as critical by the industry (SMMT, 2017). 
As Holmes (2016) notes, there are practical difficulties to be overcome with sectoral 
deals for industries like auto. A full Free Trade Agreement (FTA) would make 
exported cars free of tariffs into the EU, but to benefit from this they need to meet the 
EU’s FTA Rules of Origin.  Currently, these require 60% of a car's value added to be 
‘local’ to benefit from the FTA (or with parts and components from the EU under a 
so-called ‘cumulation’ agreement). So to eliminate border bureaucracy there would 
need to be a customs union arrangement and a Mutual Recognition agreement for 
conformity assessment. However, to ensure automatic mutual recognition of the 
UK’s conformity assessment, EEA states have to accept supranational enforcement. 
This could violate a UK ‘red line’ in Brexit talks. One possibility would be to sign a 
special FTA agreement in which both sides agreed that in industries where the UK 
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 Note, though, the attitude of the German Automotive Industry Association. A spokesperson stated: 
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keeps the same external tariffs as the EU’s common external tariff then rules of 
origin would not be checked.  As Holmes (2016) notes, such a deal is imaginable in 
cars because both sides have an interest in maintaining value chains in the sector. 
 
Firm Specific impacts 
The switching of assembly location mid-cycle for models currently made in the UK is 
not likely given high ‘double running’ costs in tooling and logistics. What is much 
more likely, though, is a shift of assembly at the point of model replacement or when 
new models are launched (LMC, 2016b). Companies assessing their assembly 
location will consider a range of issues in making such decisions, including: 
 The relative cost differences between UK and EU locations; 
 The dependency of sales of the particular model on the European versus the 
UK market; 
 The relative importance of “Made in Britain” to the brand (which is more 
relevant for premium and luxury brands); 
 The volume of imported components; 
 The  location options in the EU (linked to how much -capacity still exists in the 
European auto industry); and 
 The profitability of UK operations, and how reduced free-trade conditions with 
the EU would affect this. 
 
Uncertainty in particular over the possibility of tariffs places a question mark over the 
future of a number of UK plants and jobs. Furthermore, as supply chain investment 
moves with assemblers’ volumes, there could be a broader knock-on effect. It should 
also be noted that automotive technology is changing rapidly with developments in 
electric cars, connected cars and autonomous (driver-less) cars. As LMC (2016) 
note, a lack of FDI in such new technologies could have “a long term impact on the 
competitiveness of the UK industry.” 
A major risk facing UK auto is that investment decisions for the launch of new vehicle 
models are made several years in advance, often with plants engaged in ‘locational 
tournaments’ to win contracts to build the new models. For many companies those 
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decisions are set to be made in the middle of Article 50 negotiations.  As LMC 
(2016b) notes, “new investment initiatives in the UK, such as expansion of current 
manufacturing activity, or new capacity for manufacturers that have alternatives to 
the UK appear unlikely until current uncertainty diminishes. Such uncertainty has the 
potential to last for several years”. 
 2017 2018 2019  2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 
Honda Civic       Civic  
Vauxhall      Astra  MPV  
Mini  Countryman     Clubman Mini  
Toyota  Auris  
Avensis 
    Auris   
Nissan Leaf 
Juke 
Note   Qashqai 
XTrail 
Infinity 
Q30 
   
Jaguar XJ     F-Type XF /XE F-
Pace 
XJ / XJR 
Land 
Rover 
 Evoque New 
Defender 
 Range 
Rover 
Sport 
 Discovery 
Sport 
 Evoque 
Discovery 
Key: italics: choices over factory likely made. Bold: choices over factory yet to be 
made 
Table 1: Factory Location Choices (adapted from PA Consulting, 2016) 
 
As table 1 shows, investment decisions are already likely to have been made for the 
production of new car models in 2017-2019, including the Nissan Leaf and Juke and 
the Toyota Auris. However, the investment decisions for most cars which will be 
manufactured after 2019 are yet to be made. These include future generations of the 
Vauxhall Astra, Honda Civic, Toyota Auris and Range Rover Sport. 
   
Those investment decisions will be made in what looks to be at least a two-year 
window of uncertainty. Car makers will ask: Will the UK have access to the Single 
Market? Is investing in UK production worth the risk?  This risk is greater for ‘mass 
market’ producers who operate on low margins, low capacity, are reliant on exports 
and have new models at the planning stage. This is why PA Consulting (2016) sees 
Toyota and Honda plants as at the most risk – although LMC (2016b) sees the 
Vauxhall Ellesmere Port plant as most at risk (for example given the high degree of 
imported components). The takeover of GM Europe (including Vauxhall) by PSA 
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Group adds to this uncertainty given that the latter will be looking for significant cost 
savings (Bailey, 2017).  
 
A potential withdrawal of investment was raised by Nissan and by Ford in relation to 
engine assembly, and the Japanese government has raised concerns over the Brexit 
process and how this could impact on Japanese investment in the UK (Government 
of Japan, 2016). The Japanese government’s memorandum has emphasised the 
need for the UK to retain maximum contact with the Single Market and maintain free 
movement of worker between the UK and EU. The Japanese Ambassador to the UK 
has warned that Japanese firms could disinvest from the UK if Brexit meant that they 
could not make sufficient profits (The Guardian, 2016).   
 
Nissan itself initially stated that it would defer decisions on where to build new 
generations of models currently assembled at its Sunderland plant, with the Renault-
Nissan CEO Carlos Ghosn stating “important investment decisions will not be made 
in the dark” (Financial Times, 29/09/16). It was thought that the firm was going to 
make the Qashqai and XTrail model decisions in early 2017 but appeared to have 
pulled forward the decisions to maximise leverage on the UK government in the 
wake of the Brexit vote and uncertainty over the future of the UK's trading 
relationship with the EU. The British government knew that it couldn't afford to lose 
the Qashqai investment and Nissan effectively held a big gun to its head. A deal was 
done and Nissan announced that it would build the next generation Qashqai and 
XTrail at Sunderland after having received ‘assurances’ from the UK government (we 
return to industrial policy below). Nissan has since said that this decision will be 
reviewed once the terms of Brexit become clearer.  
 
The government has remained tight-lipped on what support as offered, even 
declining to answer requests from the Office for Budget Responsibility as to whether 
any contingent liabilities arise from the deal (The Guardian, 23/11/16). The Qashqai 
decision was clearly good news for the industry and reflected the underlying 
competitiveness of the Sunderland plant. Yet the bigger battles in securing 
investment in UK auto lie ahead – at Honda, Toyota and Vauxhall - all of which are 
more at risk of switching production from the UK to Europe if uncertainty over the 
UK’s trading relationship with Europe is not clarified sooner rather than later. 
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While firms like Nissan will certainly face challenges if the UK does not have the 
access to the Single Market, manufacturers may also try to use uncertainty as an 
excuse to cut capacity in the UK as part of wider efforts to reduce over-capacity in 
Europe (especially so given how easy it is to lay off workers in the UK compared with 
other EU countries). Ford has already scaled back investment at its Bridgend engine 
plant, although it has denied this is linked with Brexit. 
 
It should be noted that the UK auto industry’s success rests in large part on its 
productivity. The UK auto industry boasts plant utilisation running at over 70%, with 
several plants running 24/7 operations (KPMG, 2014). This compares favourably to 
European nations such as Italy, where utilisation runs at just over 50%. For example, 
Nissan’s Sunderland car plant was the UK’s most productive in 2015, building one-
in-three of all new vehicles.  The risk is that some firms will try to take advantage of 
spare capacity on the continent, shifting production from the UK at the time of new 
model launches, especially if uncertainty can be used to justify it. While some 
commentators such as LMC (2106b) note that while a ‘Hard Brexit’ (here meaning 
exiting the Single Market) may not represent a severe blow to UK auto, some volume 
(and by implication jobs in assembly and the supply chain) is likely to be lost over the 
medium to long term. LMC (2016b) note that “new investment initiatives in the UK, 
such as expansion of current manufacturing activity, or new capacity for 
manufacturers that have alternatives to the UK appear unlikely until current 
uncertainty diminishes. Such uncertainty has the potential to last for several years”.9 
 
Other impacts 
 
Even with a trade deal, there is one area where UK auto will definitely lose out, and 
that is via the ability to influence regulation in the industry. Regulation is not going 
away and if anything will be become more important as we move towards connected 
and autonomous cars. The UK will have no influence on shaping those regulations in 
Europe when it leaves. Jaguar Land Rover, for example, will have to look to the 
                                                 
9
 Dhingra et al (2016), drawing on Head and Mayer (2015) suggest that if the UK were not able to 
maintain tariff-free access to the EU, UK auto output could fall by 12% if the wake of Brexit, with 
production shifted to elsewhere in the EU and possibly other locations. 
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Slovakian government to represent it at the European level when the UK does exit 
(given that it is investing in an assembly plant in Slovakia). 
  
A second possible impact centres on the availability of skilled workers. The auto 
industry currently has some 5,000 vacancies and needs to be able to hire skilled 
workers from Europe (SMMT, 2016). Again, this needs to be sorted out as quickly as 
possible. The extent to which automotive firms in the UK are affected by controls on 
immigration will, of course, depend on the nature of any new rules. One option could 
be to extend current rules for non-EU/EEA nationals to all non-UK nationals (House 
of Commons Library, 2016). This would effectively restrict economic migration to 
highly skilled migrants, reducing the inflow of migrant workers doing low-skilled jobs. 
However, as noted by the Social Market Foundation (2016), only 12% of current EEA 
employees working in the UK as a whole would meet visa requirements that 
currently apply to non-EEA workers. This might lead to labour shortages in those 
sectors which employ a higher share of EU migrants in their workforce, including 
manufacturing (at 10%) (House of Commons Library, 2016).  A more restrictive 
immigration system might also increase burdens on automotive firms if they have to 
spend time and resources on obtaining visas and complying with more detailed 
immigration regulations.  
 
A third impact relates to university and industry access to European research 
funding, such as through Horizon 2020 (H2020). This relevant as tens of millions of 
pounds of H2020 funding has gone to UK based automotive firms to develop new 
technologies. While the Chancellor has 'guaranteed' to plug science funding gaps 
arising from Brexit, it is not clear what this means in practice and whether British 
universities and firms (including in the auto industry) will be able to participate in, and 
benefit from, Horizon 2020 collaborative research networks in the future. Ideally what 
UK auto needs to see is continued British participation in Horizon 2020 and the key 
research networks and collaboration that this involves. That could in turn underpin 
private sector investment in new technologies in the sector. A final uncertainty here 
is over the role of the European Investment Bank which has made substantial 
support available to automotive firms in the UK to develop low carbon technologies 
such as more fuel efficient engines. With the UK leaving the EU, will such types of 
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support still be forthcoming? That in turn brings us to the issue of industrial policy to 
which we turn below. 
 
All of this suggests that a number of key priorities need to be spelled out a soon as 
possible in the UK’s Brexit negotiating position so as to underpin investors’ 
confidence in UK auto (and broader manufacturing). Firstly, access to the Single 
Market needs to be maintained as part of any transitional deal. As the EEF (2016) 
notes, the UK must be prepared to make a contribution to the EU in order to achieve 
this. Secondly, maintaining the skills base is critical – this includes enabling UK auto 
to hire skilled workers from Europe. Thirdly, and linked to the first point, regulatory 
cooperation with the EU needs to be ensured. Finally, measures need to be taken to 
underpin investment in the UK, boost productivity and to develop an effective 
industrial strategy (on the latter see Bailey et al, 2015).  
 
Industrial Policy needs 
 
Britain needs to more than just strike a new trade deal with the EU, whether a short 
term interim deal or a longer term trading relationship. For example, British 
government will need to do much more to create and develop its own skills; this 
means developing better systems for education, skills training, and re-training as part 
of a wider industrial policy.  Just as the government and Bank of England have had 
to rethink fiscal and monetary policy, so too industrial policy needs to be re-
examined. Given the recent depreciation in sterling, there is potentially a new 
opportunity here for reshoring the auto supply chain further. That is not going to 
happen automatically, though, given the barriers to reshoring that have been 
identified (e.g. access to finance, skills, availability of land, energy costs) (Bailey and 
De Propris, 2014).  
 
The new government under Theresa May has brought with it a welcome change of 
tone on industrial strategy, emphasizing (to a degree) its role in the economy; see for 
example the Industrial Strategy Green Paper (HMG, 2017).10 Yet the follow up to this 
has been limited thus far. So what might a more effective industrial strategy for auto 
                                                 
10
 For a response to and critique of the Green Paper, see Regional Studies Association (2017). 
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involve? A quick recap of where we are may be useful. The coalition government’s 
record in relation to industrial strategy was mixed at best. Chancellor George 
Osborne made promising noises in a number of budgets and Autumn Statements 
over 2010-2015 about rebalancing the economy and a “march of the makers”, but 
little was delivered in reality. Some support was made available to rebuilding the 
UK’s fractured supply chains and to encouraging ‘rebalancing’ but the sums on offer 
were small and failed to match the scale of the rhetoric. Indeed, the manufacturing 
recovery since the financial crisis has been weak, characterised by concerns over its 
durability centred on fragility in key export markets, low levels of investment 
spending, concerns over the impact of high energy costs across the sector, and 
issues of skills and access to finance down the supply chain. 
 
The last government did away with the old regional development authorities and 
replaced them with the local enterprise partnerships (LEPs). The intention of 
devolving more power to ground level was laudable, but in practice many powers 
were initially recentralised and LEPs had insufficient funding anyway.  Their 
performance has been mixed. While LEPs in some areas – such as Birmingham and 
the Black Country - have received praise, more broadly there are questions as to 
how much LEPs are really doing. In particular, they lack the regional scale to support 
wider development. In addition, the coalition government was slow to address the 
problems that small businesses face in raising finance, largely because the banks 
are now much more risk-averse. These companies are crucial to industrial supply 
chains; this still requires attention. Recent governments have also made no attempt 
to address the UK’s lax takeover rules, which do little to protect strategically 
important businesses from foreign predators, in contrast with approaches taken in 
some other countries (Singh et al, 2015). 
 
On the positive side, the Cameron government did introduce a series of so-called 
Catapults. These are centres where businesses, engineers and scientists work 
together on late-stage research and development. The different catapults are each 
dedicated to different priority areas such as high-value manufacturing, transport 
systems and offshore renewables. They are about long-term sector development, so 
it is still too early to judge them, but they look like the right sort of intervention.  
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Equally encouraging has been the work of the Automotive Council, which started at 
the end of the Labour administration and which developed under Vince Cable into an 
effective body in fostering public – private cooperation and discovering knowledge in 
terms of challenges and opportunities.  The Council’s work has, for example, set out 
clear priorities for key automotive technologies that need to be developed (such as 
on powertrains, lightweighting and intelligent mobility) which has both aligned 
government support and funding and has underpinned business confidence and 
investment.  
 
More recently, though, Sajid Javid’s tenure as Business Secretary was 
disappointing.  His immediate decision to sell off a majority stake in the Green 
Investment Bank raised questions about the government’s commitment to the low 
carbon economy. The Automotive Council has continued. Critically, though, its work 
was previously backed up by a range of (modest) interventions to boost skills, rebuild 
supply chains, and encourage investment in the industry, such as through the 
Regional Growth Fund, the Advanced Manufacturing Supply Chain Initiative, and the 
Manufacturing Advisory Service (MAS).  All were scrapped by Javid during his time 
as Business Secretary. This was a shame as where policy was reasonably well 
developed, as in the automotive industry, it really did make a difference. For 
example, interventions like the Advanced Manufacturing Supply Chain Initiative and 
MAS’ Tooling Up Fund cost small amounts of money in the big scheme of things 
(£245m and £12m respectively).  
 
Enter, post Brexit vote, Greg Clark as Business Secretary. Following up from the 
Green Paper, what is to be done? Firstly, the government needs to look again at 
LEPs and return to development bodies that can intervene more widely and 
strategically at a regional level, and do ‘smart specialization’ through regional level 
industrial policies. Combined Authorities may be one way to do that (in cities at 
least), and are an area where Clark has much expertise.  Strengthening the local 
growth hubs to fill the vacuum left by the abolition of MAS could be part of this 
‘Combined Authority Plus’ model, as would complete devolution of skills funding to 
the regional level so as to enable regions to address skills shortages locally (such as 
through controlling the Apprenticeship Levy locally). Secondly, there is much more 
that the government could be doing in really trying to ‘rebalance’ the economy and 
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reduce Brexit-induced uncertainty, for example by stimulating investment in 
manufacturing such as through enhanced capital allowances, by resurrecting 
something like the Advanced Manufacturing Supply Chain Initiative (preferably on a 
much wider scale), and by plugging funding gaps for small firms in the supply chain. 
Thirdly, the government should also do something about UK takeover rules to put the 
country on a level playing field with many of its main competitors.   
 
Returning to the ‘Nissan deal’, what exactly did the government offer Nissan and 
what does it tell us about the government’s new industrial strategy and more broadly 
its negotiating stance on Brexit? On this we have learned a little from the Business 
Secretary Greg Clark late last year (The Guardian, 30/11/16).  Clark made it clear 
that a key UK objective in Brexit talks will be to avoid tariff barriers with the EU. He 
also made repeatedly reference to industry sectors and their different needs, 
implying that the UK would seek to negotiate sector-by-sector deals with the EU. 
That could see the UK trying to avoid non-tariff barriers in certain sectors like auto, 
effectively giving those sectors something like access to the Single Market.  This 
suggests that the Business department at least sees access to the EU Single Market 
as a key negotiating objective for a transitional deal at least (whether the 
International Trade Secretary Liam Fox agrees with that is another matter, of 
course). 
 
Clark’s comments raised a number of points on which the government has been 
vague so far. Firstly, Clark seemed to imply that – as a minimum - the UK could 
remain in a customs union with the EU under a transitional deal. That would go a 
long way to reassuring the auto industry on tariffs. Secondly, if the UK really does 
want to trade without tariffs and non-tariff barriers, then the EU may well extract a 
‘price’ in the form of a contribution to the EU budget, as made by Norway and 
Switzerland and noted above. Thirdly, some form of ‘referee’ may be needed to 
determine whether the UK is playing by the rules of whatever trade deal is done with 
the EU. That might be the WTO or a body linked to the EU. Fourth, despite Nissan 
wanting ‘compensation’ if tariffs are imposed, Clark has suggested that may not be 
possible under WTO rules. Finally, the government appears to have reiterated its 
support to the auto industry through the industrial strategy is now developing, on 
issues like skills, innovation and reshoring the supply chain. The latter is welcome, 
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and is something of a major U-turn as compared with the reign of the previous 
Business Secretary Sajid Javid (as noted above).  
 
More broadly, however, there is a strong case for UK industrial strategy to be 
afforded an institutional status similar to both UK monetary and fiscal policies. At the 
very least, it should be the subject of regular strategic long-term reviews. By giving it 
that sort of priority, the new government would send out the kind of powerful 
message that British industry and foreign investors need to hear.  On a positive note, 
the new Business Secretary is perhaps unique in government in bringing with him a 
welcome devolving instinct (witness his efforts at ‘city deals’) that offers the 
possibility to join up sectoral policy at the national level with place based policy at the 
regional level.  However, let’s hope the new government really is more serious about 
the need to rebalance the economy than the last one. More rhetoric about the ‘March 
of the Makers’ won’t be enough. 
 
Conclusions 
The UK’s automotive sector has been successful in recent years in growing output 
and – to a more limited degree – in sourcing more components locally.  Brexit brings 
both opportunities and challenges to the industry and it is important that these are 
tackled effectively so that the industry can continue to thrive. The Brexit vote, for 
example, leaves considerable uncertainty over the nature of the UK's trading 
relationship with the EU. That uncertainty has the potential to impact on foreign 
investment in the UK auto sector, especially when auto firms are looking to replace 
models. While Nissan has made a decision to build the next generation Qashqai and 
XTrail models at Sunderland, this will be reviewed by Nissan once the terms of Brexit 
are clearer.  Furthermore, other firms may hold off making decisions on assembly in 
the UK until they knows whether they will face tariffs when exporting to the EU. 
Plants and jobs could be at risk if such uncertainty isn't 'nailed down' quickly in the 
form of clear parameters for an interim or transitional trade deal - and preferably one 
that is as close as possible to existing Single Market arrangements. On this there is 
much more that the government could be doing in really trying to counter this 
uncertainty, for example by prioritising as part of the Brexit negotiations access to 
the Single Market under a transitional deal and ensuring that UK firms can hire 
skilled workers from Europe.  
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The UK also needs to do more than agree a new trading relationship with Europe It 
needs a new industrial strategy both to offset Brexit induced uncertainty and to 
‘rebalance’ the economy, for example by stimulating investment in manufacturing 
such as through enhanced capital allowances, by resurrecting something like the 
Advanced Manufacturing Supply Chain Initiative (preferably on a much wider scale),  
by devolving skills and training to the regional level, and by plugging funding gaps for 
small firms in the supply chain. There is the opportunity to ‘reshore’ more of the auto 
components industry if sterling settles down at the post Brexit referendum exchange 
rate. Reshoring is not going to happen automatically, though, given the barriers to 
reshoring noted above, and an effective industrial strategy is required to push this 
along. It should also be noted that the industry is undergoing profound changes, with 
shifts towards electrification, and connected and autonomous (driver-less) cars. A 
committed industrial strategy will be needed to underpin private sector investment in 
such technologies, a point which Jaguar Land Rover has been keen to stress 
regarding its aspiration to build electric vehicles in the UK (Bailey, 2016). On this we 
await more details from the government’s new industrial strategy. More broadly, 
there is a strong case for UK industrial strategy to be afforded an institutional status 
similar to both UK monetary and fiscal policies. At the very least, it should be the 
subject of regular strategic long-term reviews. By giving it that sort of priority, the 
new government would send out the kind of powerful message that British industry 
and foreign investors need to hear. The key point is that given both opportunities and 
risks arising from Brexit for UK auto, a better funded and more active industrial 
strategy is now needed to support UK automotive and manufacturing. 
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